Carry My Cross: Thoughts on Mathew 16:24

Then Jesus said to his disciples, "Whoever wants to be my disciple must deny themselves and take up their cross and follow me." [Mathew 16:24 (NIV)]

As Churchill wrote, "A man's life must be nailed to a cross of either Thought or Action." [Winston Churchill in "My Early Life", as quoted in Larry P. Arn. Churchill's Trial. Kindle ed. 2015. Location 1090.]

The image of being nailed to a cross is one of being fixed in one form or another. Choosing thought, you must think. Choosing action, you must act. What does this mean to a Christian?

If you are to be nailed to a piece of wood for a thought, it out be a Good Thought; if for an action, it ought be a Good Action. There is no sense in being nailed up for a mediocre thought or a half-hearted action.

There also seems to be a connection here to Coollidge's comments on the finality of the principles of the Declaration. The finality of "...that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights..." nails that thought up for all time, and it is a thought worth getting nailed to a piece of wood for.

We may be called to suffer for our faith, but we are not called to do so to no purpose. When choosing to take a stand, we ought always reach to the highest narrative; the highest narrative in any story is always love.

Greater love has no one than this: to lay down one's life for one's friends. [John 15:13 (NIV)]

Leadership Decapitation and Counterterrorism, References

At the ISIS/Extremism Community Briefing I gave 25 January for the Sheriff's Auxiliary, there was a discussion in Q&A about whether the removal of Osama bin Laden and other Al Qaeda lieutenants made the global terrorism situation worse. I argued that at least in some ways it did and mentioned several papers discussing the effectiveness of leadership decapitation as a counterterrorism tactic. As this is a broad policy issue rather than one of interest to the Sheriff's Office, I am going to post my response and the resources on this blog rather than on the Sheriff's Auxiliary site. Opinions here are my own, not official statements of the Sheriff's Auxiliary, Sheriff's Office, nor of any other organization.

What Is Leadership Decapitation?

Leadership decapitation is the targeted killing of top terrorist or insurgent group leaders for the purposes of destroying the command and control structure of an organization. Some authors include both capture and killing of leadership in the term. For our purposes, we focus primarily on the effects of killing such leaders and contrast it with capture or imprisonment. Drone strikes, bombings, and arranging assassinations of terrorist leaders will all fall under this general heading.

Is Leadership Decapitation Effective?

Different researchers argue about whether leadership decapitation is effective in the long term and there are certain circumstances where it may be effective. In the short term, however, decapitation has negative effects which may actually lead to escalation of violence, hardening of opposition, or fragmentation of terrorist groups into multiple independent threats.

Mia Bloom describes the struggle between terrorist groups to compete for limited funding, followers, and support, often driving a cycle of increasing extremism. If a terrorist group is not willing to embrace certain methods or approaches, such as the use of suicide terror or of women in suicide attacks, it will be outbid in the marketplace of extremism by groups with less scruples. [2006] Leadership decapitation can feed this cycle:

If the terrorist leader can be captured, imprisoned and made to denounce his/her organization this is a proven effective strategy... In contrast to this, killing terrorist leaders appears to serve the purposes of the outbidders, creates nationalist myths, martyrs, and cults of personality. [Bloom, 2006 pp 145—146]

We can see this kind of competition between Al Qaeda and ISIS, itself a spin-off of al Qaeda [Barnard & MacFarquhar, 2015]. Leadership decapitation is partly responsible for the fragmentation of Al Qaeda into multiple competing movements. This does not necessarily preclude the possibility that a long-term reduction in violence may result, but, at least in the near-term, the effect is greater chaos.

Jenna Jordan conducted an empirical study of 298 incidents of leadership targeting from 1945—2004 which found that decapitation rarely has measurable positive results and may often be counterproductive in terms of number of attacks and attack lethality [2009]:

This finding could be explained in part by the argument that arresting members of the upper echelon is more effective because they can provide essential intelligence. Cronin argues, “There is some reason to believe that arresting a leader is more effective in damaging a group than is killing or assassinating him.” She claims that killing a terrorist leader may increase publicity for the cause and create a martyr that could then attract new members to the organization. Cronin’s argument provides a more theoretical basis for the finding that decapitation is rarely effective. An increase in publicity and sympathy can have adverse reactions. [2009 pp 736]

In her study, she details specific categories of terrorist organizations which appear to be more susceptible to decapitation than others and where it may, arguably, be effective. However, she points in the above quote to another problem with assassinating enemy leadership compared to capturing them: dead leaders produce no intelligence for future operations. This has been a consistent point of failure in US drone operations. Not only have targeted killings (e.g. drone strikes) been hampered by poor intelligence, they make the problem worse by destroying potential future intelligence before it can be gathered and analysed:

Deadly strikes thus truncate the find, fix, finish cycle without exploitation and analysis — precisely the components that were lacking in the drone campaign waged in East Africa and Yemen. That shortfall points to one of the contradictions at the heart of the drone program in general: Assassinations are intelligence dead ends. [Courier and Maass, 2015]

It should be noted that Bryan Price disputes Jordan's results in an empirical study which claims that decapitation "significantly increases the mortality rate of terrorist groups, even after controlling for other factors", particularly when looking at longer term effects [Price, 2012]. It is possible that decapitation leads to reduced longevity of terrorist organizations over the long haul, even if the shorter term result may actually be an increase in number and lethality of attacks as found by Jordan.

Conclusion

If leadership decapitation is an effective long-term strategy, it is not guaranteed to be so in the short term and may even be counterproductive, resulting in higher terrorism recruitment, fragmentation of threats, more and more lethal attacks, etc., before it gets better. Either way, assassinating terrorists instead of capturing them severs the intelligence cycle making future counterterrorism efforts more difficult. When we do use targeted killings of terrorist leadership, we should do so with full consideration of which organizations may be more and less susceptible, whether capture is a better alternative, and whether leadership decapitation will adversely effect future intelligence efforts. We should also make it clear to the public that the technique, even when successful, may require substantial fortitude rather than yielding instant results.

References

[Barnard and MacFarquhar, 2015]

Barnard, Anne, and Neil MacFarquhar. 2015. “Paris and Mali Attacks Expose Lethal Qaeda-ISIS Rivalry.” New York Times, November 20. http://mobile.nytimes.com/2015/11/21/world/middleeast/paris-and-mali-attacks-expose-a-lethal-al-qaeda-isis-rivalry.html.

[Bloom, 2006]

Bloom, Mia. 2006. “Dying to Kill: Devising a Theory of Suicide Terror. Paper for Presentation to the Harrington Workshop on Terrorism.” http://www-personal.umich.edu/~satran/Ford 06/Wk 3-2 Suicide Terrorism Bloom.pdf.

[Courier and Maas, 2015]

Courier, Cora, and Peter Maas. 2015. “Firing Blind: Flawed Intelligence and the Limits of Drone Technology.” The Intercept. https://theintercept.com/drone-papers/firing-blind/.

[Jordan, 2009]

Jordan, Jenna. 2009. “When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation.” Security Studies 18 (4): 719–55. doi:10.1080/09636410903369068.

[Price, 2012]

Price, Bryan C. 2012. “Targeting Top Terrorists.” International Security 17 (51): 9–46. http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/21915/targeting_top_terrorists.html.

Dying To Win: Video Introductions To Suicide Terrorism Studies and further reading

I often recommend Robert Pape's book "Dying To Win: the Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism" to people to learn why the common views of both many of our officials and much of the public are simply wrong on the causes of suicide terror and the effects of our foreign policy. Bradley Mowell otday reminded me that there are good video lectures by and interviews of Robert Pape that go through the data he painstakingly gathered and what it unambiguously says.

The Videos

I do not usually offer videos because my brain does not work that way: I would rather read something. highlight it, mark it up and scrawl notes in the margins--- and I have a lousy Internet connection. But for people who do like videos, here are what I think are the two best on the subject. Pape's book was written in 2005 and updated in 2008. This first video is from 2011. It covers a wider context than the book and specifically talks about the modern ISIS threat, about the Palestinian Two-State Solution and other recent issues. This video, "The Strategic Logic of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria," is where I would start.

The second video is a bit older but focuses just on the dataset Pape used in "Dying to Win" and the 2008 updates in a bit more detail. Some of it is just audio and because he explains what he is showing in the graphs as he goes, the whole thing can probably be listened to in the car without the benefit of the slides or seeing him wave his arms around.

Further Reading

• Robert Pape. Dying To Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. Random House. 2006. On Amazon in both dead tree and Kindle format.
• Robert Pape and James K. Feldman. Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop It.  University of Chicago Press. Chicago. 2010. Also on Amazon.
• Capitol Books has a summary of Dying To Win in paperback and also free to Kindle subscribers.

It should be noted that Robert Pape's work is not the last word on the subject. Although his work made a significant contribution to the field, it was just the start of a whole conversation. Here are some other places you can look to expand on the issue:

• Max Abrahms critique of Pape's work: [Max Abrahms, “Dying to Win,” Middle East Policy, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Winter 2005), pp. 176–178.]
• Max Abrahms disagreeing with Pape that suicide terror is actually effective, specifically arguing that terrorism is almost completely ineffective at achieving policy goals when it primarily targets civilian populations. Abrahms identifies the very different response to Al Qaeda when it concentrated on primarily (or arguably) military targets before 11 September 2001. He also develops a substantial dataset on whether and why terrorism works to achieve policy goals: [Max Abrahms. "Why Terrorism Does Not Work." International Security. Vol. 31, No. 2 (Fall 2006), pp. 42–78 ]. (Available for free from the Muse Project.)
• "The data yield two unexpected findings. First, the groups accomplished their forty-two policy objectives only 7 percent of the time. Second, although the groups achieved certain types of policy objectives more than others, the key variable for terrorist success was a tactical one: target selection. Groups whose attacks on civilian targets outnumbered attacks on military targets systematically failed to achieve their policy objectives, regardless of their nature. These findings suggest that (1) terrorist groups rarely achieve their policy objectives, and (2) the poor success rate is inherent to the tactic of terrorism itself." pp 43-44"
• Mia Bloom discusses the group dynamics which lead an organization to adopt suicide terror as a tactic. She frames this in terms of the competition between extremist groups for constituency and funding, and how this competition forces them to escalate tactics even when those tactics are ineffective at achieving policy goals. She also discusses the similar pressures which lead Muslim extremists to incorporate female suicide terrorists even though they were culturally resistant to participation by women at all (terror has a macabre egalitarianism). [Mia Bloom,  Dying to Kill: Devising a Theory of Suicide Terror. Paper for Presentation to the Harrington Workshop on Terrorism] (PDF)
• "Suicide bombing might be considered a tactic of coercive bargaining which includes the risks of outbidding because of the competition among rival organizations utilizing the tactic. Under conditions of group competition, there are incentives for further groups to jump on the 'suicide bandwagon' and ramp up the violence in order to distinguish themselves from the other organizations." pp 137
• Bloom also goes into the difference between instrumental rationality (goal-based rationality) and value rationality based on "a conscious 'ethical, aesthetic, religious or other' belief, 'independently of its prospects of success.' Behavior, when driven by such values, can consciously embrace great personal sacrifices." [pp 125] and is critical to understanding suicide terrorism.
• Anne Speckhard extensively documents interviews she and her colleagues conducted in Chechnya and Palestine with the families of suicide terrorists and with failed suicide terrorists (those who survived and were captured or who refused to carry out an assigned mission). These accounts largely support and expand Pape's theories of why suicide terrorists carry out their acts. Many of the accounts are quite painful and very difficult to read, but it puts a human face on the kinds of circumstances which lead someone to perform so desperate an act. [Anne Speckhard. Talking To Terrorists - Understanding the Psycho Social motivations of Militant Jihadi Terrorists, Mass Hostage Takers, Suicide Bombers & 'Martyrs' to Combat Terrorism In Prison & Community Rehabilitation. Advances Press. September 11, 2012.] (Amazon link)

Conclusion

This is a complex and difficult topic, intellectually, politically, and emotionally. It is extremely difficult for most people to understand why someone would want to blow themselves up, taking a crowd of people with them and it should be. But only by understanding how we got here is it possible to find rational policies to counter the threat of terrorism. Only by understanding why people do this can we try to keep people from going down the path of violent radicalization in the first place. Although this is a painful topic, it is worth studying in order to protect ourselves, our families, and our communities. I do not have all of the answers. Hopefully this post will help you start down the road of asking the questions and coming up with answers of your own.

Are We Even Asking the Right Questions With Refugees?

For people who still think that we should continue trucking in refugees without stopping to have a serious think about it:

I am not just afraid of the refugees (or rather, of the relatively small number of refugees who are likely to be a threat), I am also afraid of us and of where this might lead. Let's say that the overwhelming majority of the refugees are wonderful people and only 4 terrorists sneak in and start killing people in Southwest Missouri. Let's even say that it is not as bad as what happened in Paris (which is likely).

How would our people respond? After Paris, French and even Americans are demanding more intense bombing in Syria. France, the US, and Russia have all intensified their bombing raids and people are cheering. Do most people even care if the bombs will help solve the problem? Do most people stop to ask if the right people are being blown up or what the moral cost is with the women and children who are also dying? Maybe it is worth the cost, maybe it is going to be effective, but do we stop to ask?

Most people do not have a Syrian in their neighborhood to take the anger out on. Syria is far away and the government acts as our proxy. We would like to think that they are acting with restraint and targeting the attacks, for instance, to avoid hospitals run by international humanitarian missions. Maybe they are, maybe they are not.

What happens after an attack in our cities when we have a handy group of Syrian refugees to take out the anger on?

Ask yourself whether some of our hotheads are going to stop and ask whether those particular refugees are really at fault. What happens here when we have American police having to decide whether to fire on American citizens attacking Syrian refugees in retaliation for dead Missourians killed by Syrians. Ask yourself who moderate Muslims will side with after pictures of Americans attacking refugees are played over and over on international news.

Don't think this can happen? You maybe have not paid attention: to the fact that Sikhs (who are not even Muslim) were mass-murdered in Milwaukee after 9-11, or that a Mosque in Joplin was burned to the ground after that same community actively volunteered to help victims of The Tornado. Or that Evangel in Springfield had to close an event related to refugees because of someone who wrote something they absolutely *should not* have written. Maybe you missed the Muslim family who had their house shot up while they were (fortunately) attending an event in support of the Paris victims. Maybe you have not been paying attention to what Trump has been advocating which belongs more in '30s Germany than in America. If we go through with this, Trump's solution is going to get much more popular. Could we live with that and call ourselves Americans? I know that I could not.

We need to stop and think this through. Very, very carefully.

Refugee Crisis: Let's Take a Deep Breath and Find the Principled Ground

As BlogSpot ate the HTML version of this paper, it is now available as PDF on Scribd.

Refugee Crisis: Let’s Take a Deep Breath and Find the Principled Ground by Eric Vought

Inviting Terror and the "This is WAR" meme

Got a chance while sick this weekend to pick up and plow through more of Furedi's "Invitation To Terror: The Expanding Empire of the Unknown" which has been a breath of perspective on the whole Global War On Terror thing. His work cuts through much of the terrorism hype of the last several decades and the myth of a "new terrorist" which threatens global catastrophe. The threat of terror is real and must be understood, but it is not fundamentally any different than the threat of terror which has existed for decades--- even a century--- before 9/11.

One of the things Furedi gets into is the sheer terror of biological/chemical attacks during the Clinton Administration following his reading of a Richard Preston docudrama (some of Preston's books are quite good--- if taken with a grain of salt) and how this likely lead to bad foreign policy decisions across the board. Biological or chemical terror, along with nuclear terror, has been predicted for decades and is an actual potential, *but* the examples we have to date are mostly proof that it is an extremely difficult tool for a non-state actor (or even a state actor) to use effectively. The Tokyo subway attacks using Sarin gas were alarming, but ineffective delivery of the toxin lead to only twelve deaths instead of the hundreds which were possible. The 9/11 terrorists did not even attempt high-tech Weapons of Mass Destruction but resorted to fairly crude means which were available to terrorists 60+ years before. Even that required sending their operatives to the United States for advance training before they could pull it off.

Overselling the threat and turning it into a Global War on Terror goes bad places. It justifies jettisoning our principles of liberty and civil rights to the curb, but that is just where it starts. Having worked in the Pentagon, I have heard the "this is War" meme before--- only rarely from the military but almost always actually from the civilians, the contractors, mercenaries, and bureaucrats who have the most to gain from war and the least to lose. It dehumanizes the enemy in order to justify depravity. Then comes the "If you are not with us, you are against us," meme to expand that list of enemies beyond what can be supported by fact or reason. Finally is "sacrifices must be made" to visit that 'war' on people who have no conceivable relationship to 'the enemy' and never did. In so doing, we sometimes do the terrorists' jobs better than they could ever hope to do. Some of those mistakes and near-mistakes are the stuff of nightmares.

Somewhere we need to have balance in our approach to the real threats we face. We need to keep our eyes open and prepare for danger without issuing an invitation to be terrorized, without doing the terrorists work for them.

Furedi's book is well worth the read, covering not just the twisted US politics of the War on Terror, but also that of the UK and offering insights on a more rational approach. [Frank Furedi. Invitation To Terror: The Expanding Empire of the Unknown. Continuum Books. UK. 2007]

Why Government Did Not Invent Uber

There is an article in this month's issue of Government Technology titled "Why Didn't Gov Invent Uber?" (seriously, page 44). Given the controversy over the ban on Uber in St. Louis, it caught my attention.

The article is asking why municipalities did not innovate themselves and come up with the (in hindsight obvious) value-add of an application matching drivers with rides. The immediately obvious answer the article dances around is of course: Government does not innovate, and really, they are not supposed to. Private industry innovates and even of that, it is really only a sliver of private industry: the outsiders, underdogs, entrepreneurs who produce innovation.

Government does not innovate because it is no good at it, has no incentive to do so, and it is not even appropriate for the public sector to take the risk with the public's money. The large corps who dominate markets have no incentive either (the article points out that Netflix developed streamed movies, not Blockbuster and Amazon, not Borders, "made it easy to buy books online"). The market leaders only innovate when they are forced to by competitors and they usually prefer to simply buy the innovator out or lobby for protective legislation. ONLY the market outsider has the incentive to take the risks to invent something like Uber knowing that 95% of such efforts FAIL. In Uber's case, the inventor won and the business is now valued at billions of dollars. This is also why public-private partnerships (one of the article's recommendations) often fail to innovate: once a business has a guaranteed market from a public monopoly, there is no reason for them to take the risk of something new (and plenty of reason for them to squash anything that someone else invents). Small-business incubators (another of the article's suggestions) can produce innovation, but only when the result must sink-or-swim on its own merit.

A disturbing bit: "While cities like Chicago and New York are now trying to play catchup and build their own official taxi apps to compete..." WHY for the love of Pete would the municipalities need to play catchup TO COMPETE? Why is it appropriate for the public sector to "compete" with a private market? What they need to do, is just *get out of the bloody way*.