Showing posts with label epidemics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label epidemics. Show all posts

Thursday, March 12, 2020

Bat Soup, the Graphic Novel - How SARS-CoV-2 enters a cell


Today we get a quick dose of microbiology and an explanation of how Bat Soup, 2019-nCoV, SARS-CoV2, (whatever you wish to call it, see a note about disease names at the bottom!), gains access to a cell and starts to infect a human host.
The more basic information people know about this disease, the more tools they have to interpret the news reports (which are often very poorly done by people who know no more than you do). This gives you a chance to make rational decisions, maybe understand what to fear and what not to. My background is described at the top of the Bat Soup for the Soul: Teaching with Coronavirus article I wrote previously.

This particular virus uses a vulnerability in the Angiotensin Conversion Enzyme 2 (ACE2) found in many human cells and, in particular, epithelial cells (lining) in the lower lung. This is the same receptor used by SARS-CoV, but quite different from MERS-CoV, the common flu, etc.


Note here that there are plant compounds or "phytochemicals" which also bind weakly to this receptor and may inhibit (temporarily block) viral activity. Host receptor blockage by phytochemicals or synthetic compounds is a hot area of antiviral research. The object, of course, is to find something which inhibits the virus without itself causing damage to humans. There are actually a substantial number of naturally-produced compounds which might do the trick with COVID-19. None have been clinically proven yet, though a few had some potential effect in studies with the original SARS outbreak in 2004 or show antiviral activity in vitro (in a test tube) or an animal model.
 
 
The coronavirus really does look a bit like a hairy ball (that is where it gets its name), but I have used a tiny bit of artistic license here.

The ACE2 receptor is part of the Renin-Angiotensin System, or RAS. The RAS regulates a number of important body functions, including respiration, heart rate, blood pressure, and kidney function.  Some of you make take medications which target angiotensin or the ACE (Angiotensin Conversion Enzyme, part of a set of related functions with ACE2). These medications, called ACE inhibitors, may cause or indicate potential complications for Bat Soup, but this is still being researched. In any case, the virus, in addition to hijacking the cell for its own purpose, causes collateral damage to the RAS and complications throughout the body of the human host.

After gaining entry into the cell and using its own machinery to replicate, the cell dies and releases more virus particles to spread further. The human body has mechanisms to try to detect and destroy these hijacked cells before they release a virus cargo (also used to fight tumors) a cytokine called TNF (Tumor Necrosis Factor). When the immune system overreacts, cytokine's go crazy attacking everything in site, causing cell damage, inflammation, viral pneumonia, etc. in what is referred to as a "cytokine storm". It is though by many researchers that the cytokine storm may be triggered as a tactic by the virus, like causing a large-scale riot to cover up a break-in in a particular building. The chaos caused by the cytokine storm permits further and faster infection and may become deadly in its own right but is very hard for modern medicine to treat.

This is, of course, a very simple attempt at explaining a complex topic. More references are included below for the adventurous reader to explore further.

References

  • Buhner, S. H. (2013). Herbal Antivirals: Natrual Remedies For Emerging and Resistant Viral Infections (e-book). Massachusetts: Storrey Publishing. Retrieved from https://www.scribd.com/book/176719013/Herbal-Antivirals-Natural-Remedies-for-Emerging-Resistant-Viral-Infections
    • Includes an in-depth section on SARS, the ACE2 receptor, and potential phytochemicals, including sources, studies, and preparations. Extremely in-depth material, but the best one-stop source for plant compound antiviral activity, research, and practice.
  • Chen, H., & Du, Q. (2020). Potential natural compounds for preventing 2019-nCoV infection Hansen. Preprints.Org, (January). Retrieved from https://www.preprints.org/manuscript/202001.0358/v1/download
  • Wan, Y., Shang, J., Graham, R., Baric, R. S., & Li, F. (2020). Receptor recognition by novel coronavirus from Wuhan: An analysis based on decade-long structural studies of SARS. Journal of Virology, (January). https://doi.org/10.1128/JVI.00127-20
  • Bat Soup for the Soul: Teaching with Coronavirus describes disease models and spread statistics to the non-epidemiologist with graphical illustration.
  • The Confusing World of Disease Mortality Statistics in Simple Numbers
If you want to learn more about the general mechanisms of viruses (e.g. influenza), there is an excellent online Virology 101 course/podcast with plenty of diagrams and examples (free).

An Explanation of Names


When it was originally discovered, this virus, which was found to belong to the general family of the coronavirus, was simply labelled 2019-nCoV or "2019 novel coronavirus", novel, here, meaning simply previously unknown and poorly understood. As more about the virus was learned, it was renamed to SARS-CoV-2, formally signifying that it was closely related (but not identical to) the SARS outbreak of 2003-2004. The disease the virus causes is called COVID-19 (Coronavirus disease of 2019).

The two names can be a little confusing, but it is similar to HIV/AIDS: the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) causes AIDS. Most of the time, the names can be used interchangeably unless you wish to make it clear that you specifically mean either the virus itself or its disease in humans. "Coronavirus" is often an acceptable shorthand as long as it is clear that it potentially refers to more than one virus which affect both humans and animals.

I started using the nickname "Bat Soup" before a formal name had been decided on, based on the urban myth (almost certainly not true) that the original victims got the virus from eating undercooked bat soup. In any case, this tiny virus has put many people in "deep soup".

Wednesday, March 11, 2020

The Confusing World of Disease Mortality Statistics in Simple Numbers

2b/~2b: 'How Many?' is the question!

There is a lot of confusion and debate over mortality figures for novel coronavirus (COVID-19, formerly 2019-nCoV). Most people see the numbers but do not understand how they are derived and therefore may be confused on how to compare numbers from different outbreaks or even the same outbreak on different days or different sources.

As discussed in my previous article, "Bat Soup for the Soul: Teaching with Coronavirus", the simple answer to how deadly this new virus is is that it is a good deal less deadly than SARS-CoV was and a good bit more deadly than the seasonal flu (but affects somewhat different age-groups--- out of scope for this article). At the same time, it is markedly more transmissible than SARS was and somewhat less transmissible than the flu. So, bottom line is that it does less damage on an individual basis than SARS but already has affected many more individuals (and continues to do so). Similarly, it is likely to spread less effectively than the flu but hurt more of the people it does infect (especially the elderly).

[Version 1.1 20200311: corrected typo in equation. Thank you CEMV!]

Less Deadly Is Not Always 'Good'

In general, we often see that less deadly diseases spread faster for the simple reason that people who get quickly and desperately sick do not tend to want to run around and spread disease! When someone has only mild symptoms or takes longer to get sick, they have opportunities to pass the infection to more people. But let us take a quick look at how the mortality figure is derived and why estimates may differ very sharply. We will walk through the math but with deliberately very simple numbers to start:

Let's say you have an outbreak with 20 people infected. At the time we measure, there are 5 fatalities, 5 serious cases, 5 recovered cases, and 5 mild cases. What is the fatality rate?

The quick answer is to divide 5 fatalities by 20 total cases for 25%:

5/20 = 0.25 = 25%

This is more or less the type of number often published for COVID-19. At this moment, using Johns Hopkins' tracker, you get:

4,373 deaths / 121,564 total cases = 0.35981047 or 3.6%

Don't put ANY stock in that specific number because it will be different by the time you read this. If you take this number at different times over the outbreak, the number varies somewhat, and the numbers published by various clinicians or regional authorities vary a great deal because they are taking numbers from their specific populations. Depending on what numbers you use, you can get anywhere from 0.7% to almost 8%, for instance, from different phases of the outbreak in China (according to WHO's report on the Joint Mission to China at the end of February).

OK, so why are people arguing about this? Why are some people saying the number is "wrong" or "likely wrong".

Well, there are a couple of issues with using this number reflexively.

 

Crude Mortality versus Completed Cases

First, the number is subtly wrong from the way most people think of the probability of dying from a disease. The number above is really what is often referred to as "crude mortality" because it includes uncompleted cases. What does that mean?

In our first set of numbers, we have 10 people, 5 serious cases and 5 mild cases, who have neither recovered nor died (yet). Presumably, they will do one or the other eventually. When looking at past epidemics, like the final numbers for the SARS outbreak in 2004, every case is completed because no one is still walking around actively infected with SARS-CoV-1! So let's fix the number by only including completed cases:

5 deaths / (5 deaths + 5 recovered) = 0.5 = 50% (!)

Ten people total in our example have either died or recovered, so that goes on the bottom. With the other ten people we simply do not know (yet) what will happen. Hopefully that makes sense so far. Mortality calculated from completed cases will tend to be higher for an active outbreak versus a past outbreak, so one must take some care comparing typical actively reported numbers versus historical. But it takes time during an outbreak to get statistically meaningful numbers of recovered cases, so crude mortality is usually what you get.

To take real coronavirus numbers further, we get:

4,373 deaths / (4,373 + 66,239) =  0.061929984 or 6.2%

This is usually what people are really thinking of when they ask "If I am in fact infected, what is my chance of dying once the disease runs its course?" As you can see, it is worse than the crude mortality frequently published. If only two of the serious cases later die and the rest recover, you will see yet a different (lower) number. But wait...

How Many People Actually Get the Disease?


The number you get is clearly heavily influenced by the number of cases of infection you use in the first place. Is this number "correct"? Well, probably not, and how much it is off is a matter of great debate. What happens if you are "infected" but have a mild case (or maybe do not even notice) and never get tested? You won't be included in the numbers at all. Going back to our simple example, if we say that the mild cases are simply never noticed, we get:

5 deaths / 15 cases = 0.333... or 33%

This number is higher than our initial 25%, but we know it does not actually reflect reality. So, let us say that instead of 121,564 cases of COVID-19 world-wide (the confirmed case count from above), we actually have one mild or asymptomatic case for each confirmed case, someone running around who may think they merely have a cold or whatever. Then we get:

4,373 deaths / 121,564*2 total cases =0.1798641 or 1.8%

Well, that looks better, doesn't it? This is the kind of thing you will see in many estimates of COVID-19 mortality, depending on what they use as their guess of how many mild or asymptomatic cases there are. In theory, the unknowns could affect the death count as well (two of the confirmed cases in Washington state were diagnosed postmortem), but we tend to be a bit better at noticing when someone actually keels over as opposed to when they just have a sniffle for a day or two.

Getting Actual Numbers

So, how does one figure out which number is the "correct" number to use for actual cases? How do you account for what you do not know?

Well, people guess from various disease models based on past outbreaks or on detailed numbers from one part of an outbreak. But the tried-and-true method is to swab and test everything that moves throughout a community (at least on a random sample basis) to find out how many people running around have the disease but have not actually showed up at a hospital. China, after a very rough beginning, has started to do this and, as a result, their case-counts, while initially sketchy, are a great deal more reliable. They did actually find unreported cases lurking around the community, mild cases, cases mistaken for something else, people afraid to report, etc., but not that many. South Korea has also done extensive testing around their outbreak (and, interestingly enough, their mortality figures are closer to 0.7%, at the low end of what China found).

The US has done very little of this at all and has suffered from a chronic shortage of test kits. Numbers for our domestic outbreaks (and consequently, estimates of mortality in the US) are therefore extremely poor. Presumably, if we actually had the foggiest clue how many people were infected, our mortality figures would be much lower than they appear. But we just do not know--- and cannot until the test kits catch up, which they are starting to do as of this writing on 11 March.

Be aware, then, if you use global case-counts and deaths, you are getting a mixed bag of both good data and bad data. That results in a number which--- well, it isn't wrong, it is a calculation, and it is what it is, but--- may not be very reliable from predicting the future. Using numbers from countries or regions we know have better data may give better results, but then you have to ask yourself whether the results China gets in their health system or South Korea in theirs will apply equally to the US population and our health system. Roughly, perhaps, but never exactly. HIV spread very differently in European populations than in African populations to what turns out to have been a genetic leftover from bubonic plague: that stuff happens and is inherently unpredictable.

Conclusion


So, what then? What conclusion can we solidly make?

Well, we come back to the beginning: "a good deal less deadly than SARS-CoV was and a good bit more deadly than the seasonal flu". (And, by the way, this virus seems to leave (most) children (<20 years) alone, and that is rather interesting, isn't it?)

Tuesday, January 28, 2020

Bat Soup For the Soul - Teaching With Coronavirus

It is time to speak of many things, of cabbages and kings, of why Bat Soup is boiling hot and whether it has wings...

There is a great deal of media discussion about the 2019-nCoV, 2019 Novel Coronavirus, outbreak in Wuhan China. Some are predicting dire catastrophy, others are saying it is just a distraction from impeachment. The problem is that most people do not understand viruses or epidemiology enough to judge what is being written, to understand whether this or that recent news is important. I am, myself "concerned" about the outbreak, very concerned about the catastrophe for the victims in China and "somewhat concerned" about what may happen here. I also see this as a "teaching moment" to try to explain some of the concepts behind the progress of and efforts against the disease.

  • Draft 1.1.1 11 March 2020 - Added link to Flatten the Curve chart (#FlattenTheCurve) and some discussion at end of article now that we have community spread in the US.
  • Draft 1.1 2 February 2020: Added, briefly discuss, a Lancet paper presenting a more involved (SEIR) model. Editorial corrections. Organized References. 1.1.01 same day: typo correction.
  • Draft 1.01 29 January 2020: Corrected significant typo in discussion of Basic Reproduction Number. Thanks CEMV;
  • Draft 1.0: 28 January 2020. Initial complete text. Needs a proof-reading pass or two, apologies.

If you are in a real hurry and do not have time to learn the underlying how and why, this same basic thing is presented in one chart as Flatten the Curve. I discuss this idea a bit more at the bottom and why we have suddenly gone from trying to "stop" the virus to spreading it out in time. (Thank you, Christie!)

Personally, I went from college (Environmental Science) to Air Force Studies and Analyses. My thesis was the production of a computer simulation toolkit for environmental and biological systems in C++. When I was learning these things, the computer resources for exploration were either not available for students or extremely expensive, and I added to the pool of such tools available. At the Pentagon, I mainly supported intelligence analyses using computers: improving, maintaining, and writing tools to analyze intelligence data, including Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) warfare models. Since I did not have formal training in epidemiology, I had to learn much of it the hard way, talking to people who did and entombing myself in the Pentagon library for days-at-a-time until I understood what I had to make the simulation simulate, making mistakes, and doing it again until the mistakes went away. That experience does not make me a virologist or an epidemiologist now, but it means I have enough background to understand the papers being published and the data about the course of the disease.

[If you are dumb (or determined?) enough to try to learn the same why I did, some useful starting points are given at the bottom...]

I am going to try to explain some basic principles here about how some of the data coming out of China might affect the United States if the virus spread across the Pond and achieved effective human-to-human transmission here. What I am going to show you is not a predictive model but a teaching tool to understand how such a disease might progress in a large population with no effective medical prevention. Clearly, medical intervention will be attempted and some of it undoubtedly will be successful. The use of this model is to show what those medical efforts need to prevent and some of the issues involved.

If you are math challenged, don't worry about the equations as much. The graphs should give you a feel for what is happening. If you like math, the equations included will give you a means to play with the numbers yourself.

(Brief) Background On the Virus


The 2019-nCoV is a coronavirus which has been discovered in Wuhan, China related to two previous disease outbreaks, SARS-CoV (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) and MERS-CoV (Middle East Respiratory Syndrome). The coronavirus family normally produces disease in bats, not humans. 2019 Novel Coronavirus is just a placeholder title for a specific coronavirus which in some way has learned how to infect humans. The scientific community has not come up with a handier title yet, so for ease of discussion and in honor of the popular (but likely incorrect) idea that it came from eating bat soup, I am going to refer to it as the Bat Soup Surprise Virus, "Bat Soup" or BSSV for short.

As of this writing, Bat Soup has infected roughly 4,000 people, almost all in China of which almost 100 have died. There have been 5 confirmed cases in the US, but all of these are imported cases, people who were infected overseas before coming to (or returning to) the US. I am not even going to try to print and cite up-to-date numbers here because they are changing too rapidly.

Animal viruses do cross over to humans from time to time. In many cases, they fail to effectively replicate in humans and therefore simply fizzle out. This virus is concerning because it has demonstrated sustained human-to-human transmission over more than five generations of confirmed cases and does not show signs of weakening. Attempts are ongoing to contain it to China, to locate, isolate, and treat the leakers who have brought the disease to other countries. In China, a large scale quarantine has affected more than 55 million people, including 11 million in the greater Wuhan area and 33 million in a neighboring city. The CDC is working to track contacts of infected people who came to the US and to process test samples to determine who among them may have the virus. This kind of effort is precisely what stopped the spread of SARS in 2003-2004.

Compared to SARS or MERS, this virus is more contagious but considerably less lethal, making it more likely to escape containment and spread but likely to cause fewer fatalities if it does. SARS had a case-fatality rate of about 10%, MERS about 37%; the Spanish Influenza of 1918 somewhat less than 5%; this disease is variously calculated at 4% or 3% and (for a variety of reasons) the actual number is likely to be lower as (if) it spreads.

The Basic Reproductive Number


A critical number for understanding disease epidemics of any type is the Basic Reproductive Number or R0 (often pronounced "R-nought"). This is often talked about but seldom actually explained. The Reproductive Number is the average number of successful transmissions of the disease from one individual. If one person manages to infect two other people (before recovering or dying) and each of those new infected people manage to each infect two other people (and so on), then the Reproductive Number (R) is 2.0, as shown in the following illustration:
Note that R is really an average. Bob might infect 4 people and Susan only 1 (avg = 2.5). It depends both on how contagious the disease is and on how many people Bob and Susan regularly come into contact with! For the same reason, R will almost certainly change over the course of an outbreak, as it encounters different conditions and as the medical community tries to stop its progress. The Effective Reproductive Number at time t or R(t) describes this change over the course of an epidemic. The Basic Reproductive Number, R(0), is then the "ideal" R at the start of the disease in a virgin population and overall (roughly) describes the capacity of the disease to move from human-to-human in a population. Strictly speaking, this number is different for Bat Soup in China versus Bat Soup in the US.  The population density and social habit in Wuhan is just a little bit different from, say, rural Southwest Missouri or even Brooklyn. In common usage, R(0) is used to compare different diseases across populations. Just keep in mind that this common usage is not entirely accurate.

Notice what happens when R changes in the illustration. There are three "interesting" ranges for R in describing diseases:
  1. R is less than 1.0: On average, each infected person infects less than 1 other person in each generation of the disease. Over time, this disease will fail to spread and die out. The Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS-CoV) had an R0 of slightly less than 0.7 and did not effectively spread.
  2. R is exactly 1.0 (shown): Each infected person, on average, infects 1 new person. The disease remains in the population, going neither up nor down.
  3. R is more than 1.0 (shown): the number of infected people will tend to increase in the population from generation to generation of the disease. Growth is exponential, slow if R is near 1.0 and increases rapidly as R increases. Many infectious diseases range from 1.0 to 3.0. Some extremely infectious airborne diseases (e.g. measles) can be 15, 20, or even more.
Handily, this tells us the goal of epidemiology in an outbreak: convince the Effective Reproductive Number to be less than 1.0. Public health efforts do not have to actually stop the disease or prevent every case. If R(t) is less than one, the disease will die out on its own, even if infection continues for a time. There is a "good enough" point which gets the job done and protects the public. This is how SARS was stopped.

Time in Disease Models: Incubation, Latency, and Generation Time

To understand disease spread, you have to not only understand how many people it can infect, but how long it takes to do it. This section explains some basic terms for time with respect to infections.

When one or more pathogens (the infective agent, whether virus, bacteria, fungus, etc.) enters a human host, they cannot spread or cause disease immediately. The pathogen has to multiply in the body first, bypassing or overpowering the immune system, and reach some critical mass. Someone sneezes on you and eventually you start sneezing on others. The average time it takes between initial exposure and the development of symptoms is called incubation time. The time between initial exposure and when the host becomes contagious is known as latency.

Often, we assume that these numbers are the same, that is, that the disease can be spread starting when symptoms appear. This makes sense, because symptoms like coughing, sneezing, diarrhea, etc, are in fact the very tools the pathogen uses to infect people. They may not be precisely the same, however, (and may or may not be the case with Bat Soup) but that discussion is outside the scope of this article. Just keep in mind that they may be different things and plough forward for now, intrepid reader.

This concept of latency is what provides the time clock in a disease model. The latency period, the time it takes for a host to be exposed, for the infectious agent to multiply in their body, and for them to infect others is the Generation Time. The generation time will tend to be a bit larger than the latency period because the disease cannot successfully spread until it becomes infectious, it comes in contact with a susceptible host and the transmission to the new host succeeds. Combined with R, we can figure out how quickly a disease will spread from generation to generation of the infectious agent (a virus in this case). We will make use of this number in a little bit.



The World Health Organization (WHO) has listed 4 days as the average incubation time for BSSV in a range from 1 to 13 days. That means that if someone is exposed and has not developed the disease in 14 days, it is not considered likely that they will. This then becomes a handy number for isolating suspected cases. The generation time used by one model (see References) is either 8.3 or 6.8 days, meaning that, on average, it is thought to spread most easily a bit after symptoms first appear. The first number is the generation time measured for SARS-CoV and so it simply assumes that Bat Soup works the same way (it may not). The second number assumes that the generation time for this virus is a bit shorter. Whether or not these numbers are correct is again, outside our current scope, but they give us good numbers to work with for our model below.

Susceptibles and Immunity

Now that we know how many people a pathogen might infect and how quickly it can do it, we need to look at who it can infect. That subject can be complex, particularly when it has to take into account prior immunity and vaccination rates, but (fortunately or unfortunately) it is much simpler with respect to Bat Soup and a population which has never been exposed to it before. The number of susceptibles, S, is initially the number of people in the population.

But what about after the disease starts to spread? In each generation of the virus, people get infected and those people either recover or do not (die). If they recover, they develop immunity (presumably) to future infections, so, either way, anyone who is infected is removed from the pool of future susceptibles. We have to track this number in our model. S(t) is the number of susceptibles at generation t.

The Reed-Frost Epidemic Model

And now we have enough pieces to get to our simple epidemic model, the Reed-Frost model of an epidemic. Wade Hampton Frost was a late 19th, early 20th century epidemiologist. Lowell Reed and Frost developed this model in 1928. The Reed-Frost model is a simple iterative or step-based model, easy to calculate on paper or with a spreadsheet. It is deterministic (not random or not "stochastic"). It has a great many limitations, but is often used as a teaching model because it is easy to do, easy to play with the numbers and get instant results.

(Reed-Frost is sometimes referred to as an SIR model (Susceptible-Infectious-Removed) and is one of the simplest in a family of models known as Compartmental Models. We'll touch on this a little more in a bit.)

For many reasons, Reed-Frost is not likely to be accurate, and we'll get into some of those reasons after we explore the model itself. It will, however, visually demonstrate the pieces we have explained above given real numbers from the current outbreak and then, hopefully, give the reader some insight into the practical effect of developments in the news. This, in turn, may make people either less or more afraid, depending on whether they currently fear too little or too much... In either case, the fear will hopefully be more rational and appropriate.

[Trigger warning: equations follow - if you are arithmophobic, just close your eyes, think of England, and go on with the text (after opening your eyes again).]

The Reed-Frost model uses the following formula:
C(t+1) = S(t) * (1 - (1 - p)^C(t))  [Note to self: replace with LaTeX equation for better display]
Where:
  • C(t+1) will be the number of cases for the next generation of the model.
  • S(t) is the number of susceptibles for at time (generation) t. (You will need to multiply by the number of days in a generation to get a time in days.)
  • p is the probability that any given infected person will successfully infect someone else within one generation. This probability is fixed and does not change over the course of the epidemic in the Reed-Frost model!
  • C(t) is the number of (active, not total!) cases in the current generation.
The idea is that you start with the initial number of infections (say, a single individual who gets off an aircraft from another country), and an initial number of susceptibles (the whole population in our case) and use that to calculate the next generation, C(t+1). You then subtract that count from the susceptibles and do it again. And again. And again. At each generation, the number of cases increases as the number of susceptibles decreases. Eventually, the chance of an infected person successfully contacting a susceptible starts dropping sharply and the number of new infections falls off. This creates a characteristic curve we shall see below.

The Reed-Frost model makes a number of assumptions, including the fact that p is assumed to not change over the course of the epidemic (it does not allow for successful intervention or even changes in population density and habits within the population, say rural Alabama vs. urban California). It assumes that contact is random and the population is thoroughly mixed. Sometimes these assumptions make it pessimistic, other times optimistic, still other times just a bit off. If we keep these things in mind, it is a useful tool.

As with our discussion of R, if S(t) * p is above 1, the epidemic continues to grow. In contrast, if it is below 1, the epidemic will tend to shrink. S(t) * p models the Effective Reproduction Number or R(t) for a given generation. Given a population of 100 people, an R(t) of 2 gives a p of 2%, an R(t) of 1 gives a p of 1% and so forth, but this input number must get smaller with larger populations.

Given those notes, we show a graph of the Reed-Frost model for Bat Soup given an initial population of 331 million, an R(0) of 2.1, a case-fatality of 3%, and a generation time of 6.8:

The number of cases builds slowly, the number of susceptibles falls, and they cross here on day 176.8 (generation 27). The peak number of cases is a little over 56 million with a final death death toll of 8.2 million. We can see from this, that even with a disease with a relatively low lethality but good ability to spread, the losses can be considerable. The number of people who are simultaneously ill can itself be "problematic" even if most of them recover. We also, see, however, that the build to peak happens over almost half a year even in this dire case.

Now we look at a different case, one where the R(0) is 1.5 (the minimum WHO estimate), the case-fatality is 0nly 1% (but still 10 times common influenza), and the generation time is 8.3 days.
In both cases, our spreadsheet takes the epidemic out 50 generations. In this second one, we see that the peak happens at well over a year (390 days, generation 48). At peak, there are just shy of 16 million simultaneous cases and a death toll (by generation 50) of 1.75 million. This kind of scenario would take into account that our health system and prevention measures would both slow the spread and produce fewer fatalities than in China.

Lastly, we produce a graph with an R(0) of 1.5, case-fatality of 2%, generation time of 6.8 days.
Here we peak at 20.7 million active cases in generation 46 (306 days) with a cost of 3.5 million lives by generation 50. We can vary the graph in a number of ways, but you can see that the curves have the same general shape.

What the Model Shows Us

From these different graphs, we can get a feel for some principles of epidemiology in a case like this. Specifically, we see that, no matter what R(0) is, the virus will eventually touch almost the entire population if it is not actively stopped: it is just a question of how long it takes. That also means that for a given case-fatality rate, the final death toll doesn't really change, it is just spread over a shorter or longer period of time.

We also see that being able to adjust the rate of spread dramatically changes the peak number of infections and the amount of time we have to come up with interventions. Having, say, 50 million people all sick in bed at one time would clearly bring many functions of society to a halt, even with a moderate cost in lives. This means, in turn, that contact tracing, appropriate travel restrictions, self-quarantine, closing schools or public events where necessary, etc., can make a phenomenal difference in the overall cost of the epidemic in both economic and human terms. At best, it can bring the R(t) to below 1.0 and actually halt the spread. According to the report I got these input numbers from, the spread of this disease must be slowed by at least 60% to halt the epidemic [Imai, et al, "Report 3", see References below]. [Update 11 March 2020: as of the time the WHO Joint Mission to China returned and published (24 Feb), this has actually been achieved in China. New cases are still occurring, but the outbreak there has stopped growing. Now China is sending a mission to help Italy.]

If spread is never halted but simply works its way through the susceptibles in the population one generation at a time, a new disease may become "endemic", it reaches an equilibrium state where immigration and births provide new hosts to balance those lost to immunity or death. Human-kind deals with a number of such endemic diseases.

[Update 11 March 2020] The Flatten the Curve chart shows this same concept in very simple form. At the point where we now have community spread in the US and over 100 countries with cases globally, our chances of "stopping" the virus are close to zero. But if we can slow spread, it makes the difference between an outbreak that the US health system can keep up with and one, like Italy, where the system is overwhelmed and people die who might otherwise be saved.]

What the Model Does Not Show But Might Be Important

As mentioned above, the Reed-Frost Model has a number of shortcomings. Better models have been produced in general and specific models are being produced in the literature for this particular virus. All of them are going to be "a bit more complicated" than what we have here. Let's briefly discuss some of the important aspects of real-world virus behavior against our crude model.

Fixed p and Nosocomial Infections

As already mentioned, p is fixed in this model. We would expect that public health efforts from the national to community to individual level would lessen the spread over time. One of the critical ways this is so is with so-called nosocomial infections. This is a strange word you may encounter in the news but it is really very simple: a nosocomial infection is one which occurs in a healthcare setting, whether from the first responder (maybe a paramedic or LPO who first discovers a victim) to the hospital ICU and everywhere in-between. Paradoxically, the healthcare apparatus can be the greatest risk in combating infection. In past epidemics, healthcare workers, including first responders, paramedics, LPOs (who may be the first responder before paramedics are called), nurses, doctors, etc., can be exposed to infectious disease at rates 10 or 100 times as much as the rest of the population. When these health care workers start to get infected and sick in numbers, it strips the population of the very people who are depended upon to protect everyone else.

This is one of the reasons that infectious disease precautions and procedures are drilled so hard into everyone in the healthcare system, even volunteers like myself who are on the very edges of the system. It is why we drill things like "gloves and masks" and proper hand-washing very hard in training (and will certainly be doing so in the coming year!) Controlling nosocomial infections has the potential to dominate the course of a disease and did so with SARS. It is also important that trained volunteers exist in the community in advance to step in as attrition reduces the number of professional responders available for routine tasks. Everyday emergencies do not simply stop during an epidemic.

Self-Protection For Communities and Families

Some of the same basic techniques, including disciplined disinfection and handwashing, also reduce R(t). Every table (or, these days, touchscreen ordering device) at a restaurant which gets disinfected, every doorknob cleaned, can stop several infections. But the best approach for the general populace may simply be to temporarily reduce contacts with others (self-quarantine) to deny the virus opportunities for transmission. A bit of preparedness, such as a well-stocked pantry, materials for temporary home-schooling, or the ability to telecommute to work go a long way toward making self-quarantine possible and effective.

New Interventions?

We may end up with new interventions during the course of an epidemic, such as experimental vaccines (usually prioritized for healthcare workers for the reasons given above), better antivirals, etc. All of these can change the curve we see.

To Everything There Is a Season...

The other thing this model does not show is normal seasonal variation. With 170 days or more to peak in these graphs, the yearly changes in weather and activity will affect the course of infection. Infectious droplets from coughing or sneezing are not as effective at spreading disease in the summer when people spend more time outside, the windows are open, and schools are closed. If the start of sustained spread doesn't happen until warmer weather, the progress should be considerably slower. It would, however, pick up again as schools reopen and the weather turns cold (typical flu season). Past flu pandemics, such as the 1918 Spanish Flu progressed in waves, and this is one of several likely reasons.

Population Differences and Super-Spreaders

Some locations tend to spread illness no matter what interventions are taken or how low R(t) can be gotten outside of them. Major measles outbreaks frequently start at places like Disney World or university mega-campuses. When an infected person can come into contact with hundreds of people on a typical day, even a very low p can result in infections. Similarly, certain people (say, teachers, salespeople, paramedics, bat soup connoisseurs...) tend to be exposed to and potentially spread disease much more than the rest of the population. These sub-populations can continue to be sources of infection before an epidemic really builds and long after it wanes. The Reed-Frost model is simply not sophisticated enough to show such super-spreaders.

SEIR: A Slightly More Complex Model

To see how this kind of thinking applies to a real exploration of Bat Soup. you might try looking at Wu, Leung, and Leung, "Nowcasting and forecasting the potential domestic and international spread of the 2019-nCoV outbreak originating in Wuhan, China: a modelling study" (full citation in References) to see how much you can follow along, what important concepts you can pick out.
  • What numbers do they use for R(0), for generation time, etc.?
  • What do they assume about incubation and latency?
  • How do they try to control for the success of interventions in limiting the spread of disease?
  • What kind of timeline do the authors suggest for international spread?
There are a couple of pieces of their argument that I am not sure I fully understand or fully agree with, and I would not expect someone working from just my explanations here to do more than skim. The challenge, if you accept it, would be to see whether you could understand enough to judge how the model they present could be important and what it says about potential spread.

That paper presents an SEIR model (Susceptible-Exposed-Infected-Removed; Trigger Warning: scary equations in link) to try to take into account air travel data from China to better understand the real scope of the infection inside Wuhan (including the likely very high number of cases even the Chinese authorities do not know about) and then predict spread forward in the regions outside of Wuhan in China and internationally.

SEIR is another in the family of Compartmental Models and it is usually presented as a system of Ordinary Differential Equations (ODE), requiring knowledge of calculus, which I rather wanted to avoid in the body of this article. The relationships and results are shown in decent graphs (except for the European number formatting that always takes me a bit to adjust to). At the very least, this should give you a taste for what a typical real-world publication may look like (and why most people don't read them?).

Conclusion, References, Further Reading


So, now that we have almost gotten to the end, hopefully you have a bit better grasp of how infectious disease spreads, perhaps enough to better understand why one outbreak may be more worrying than another, and why some developments in the news may be something that needs to be paid attention to while others can be passed over. An understanding of terms and principles can help you decide whether you need to worry and how much worry is appropriate.

Personally, however, I figure that some basic preparations and precautions are almost always justified, simply because if Bat Soup does not take wing, something else someday most definitely will. Concentrate on those preparations which will not hurt you either way and which you will eventually use regardless (say, some long-term food storage or a bottle or two of disinfectant, the means to work from home when you need to, good nutrition including vitamin C and D, some first aid training, etc.).

References and Links

  • If you want my spreadsheet for educational use, ask. I am working on adding some notes and making it a little more user friendly.

Reed-Frost and Compartmental Models

  • The Reed-Frost Model has a basic entry in Wikipedia, a better but still approachable description is in "Epidemiology - An Introduction" by Kenneth J. Rothman. 2nd Edition. Oxford University Press. Oxford. 2012 pp 118-119. Kindle ed. Available.
  • The Basic Reproduction Number (R(0)) and the other concepts above can also be explored on Wikipedia and are defined in Rothman 2012. Both sources also have tables of estimated R(0) for a number of diseases. I have just seen (28 January) that the Wikipedia article now includes some referenced R(0) estimates for Bat Soup, which, obviously, Rothman 2012 does not.
  • Compartmental models in general have a Wikipedia entry, including exploration of SIR and SEIR models (Calculus again!). There is also a long article/report/short book by Fred Braur freely available (PDF): [Brauer, F. (2008). Compartmental models for epidemics. Vancouver, B.C.: Research Gate. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228594171_Compartmental_models_for_epidemics]
  • The Bat Soup SEIR model I discuss above: [Wu, J. T., Leung, K., & Leung, G. M. (2020). Nowcasting and forecasting the potential domestic and international spread of the 2019-nCoV outbreak originating in Wuhan , China : a modelling study. Lancet, 6736(20). https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(20)30260-9]

Numbers Used For My Bat Soup Model

  • For the R(0) and generation time numbers used above: [Imai, N., Cori, A., Dorigatti, I., Baguelin, M., Donnelly, C. A., Riley, S., & Neil, M. (2019). Report 3 : Transmissibility of 2019-nCoV. London. Retrieved from https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.01.23.916395v1, Accessed 27 January 2020]

 Exploring Epidemiology

  • For more in-depth exploration of epidemiology, I strongly recommend ["Principles of Epidemiology, a Self-Teaching Guide" by Roht, Selwin, et al. Academic Press, NY., 1982.] It is one of the books I started with "in the day" and is still useful. I have recently discovered that it is available as an e-book. It provides a clear path to work through concepts, terms, and exercises, looking up the topics in other books as necessary. That is why it does not go out of date: if you use more current books and articles to look up the information to do the exercises, you will keep current with new developments. This could be a very useful approach for, say, a homeschool unit for an adventurous older student. Most of it is approachable with a strong grasp of algebra and basic statistics. The tools needed to rough out models, like spreadsheets with good built-in functions or even programming environments like Lua, are all freely available these days.
  • Epidemiology texts, resources, and papers can sometimes be awfully expensive. Being retired, I tend to look for books at library sales where extremely expensive reference books can go for a few dollars. I also periodically visit the St. John's Cancer Center Community Health Library in Springfield, MO, which has a fantastic array of resources, including references and journals. Getting a library card from them is not expensive (though I forget the exact amount currently). If you are not local, you may have similar resources in your community, such as a college or university library open to the public. Some institutions, including my college, also offer alumni J-Store accounts with a selection of journals; it may be worth checking to see if you have access to such a program.

Tuesday, February 17, 2015

The Debate On Mandatory Vaccination Often Misses the Mark

[Partial Draft 0.8]
This article explores the current measles outbreak:
  • measles vaccination
  • vaccines in general
  • legal and moral issues of vaccine mandates
  • the right of personal bodily-integrity versus government coercion
  • Supreme Court precedent and public health law
In so doing, I may very well offend all of my readers in one fashion or another, but the intersection of public health policy and personal liberty is probably one of the most delicate balancing acts we perform in the maintainence of a free (and hopefully healthy) society. Disagreement on the matter is virtually guaranteed and probably desirable, especially if we actually look at the facts that somehow persistently escape the attention of the pundits on all sides. The issue is deadly serious: if you aren't offended, you may not be paying attention.

A Pox On Vaccine-Deniers?

There has been a lot of coverage lately of the measles outbreak and many pundits laying the blame at the feet of "vaccine-deniers". The press seems to have gotten tired of covering the Ebola outbreak (which is still ongoing by the way) and found a new toy.

First of all, what precisely is going on? 2015 has, indeed seen an unusual outbreak of measles, which was declared eliminated in the US in 2000 but occasionally resurfaces from overseas, the most recent outbreak apparently from the Phillipines. From December 2014 to January 2015, there were 52 associated cases and 8 hospitalizations. ["U.S. Multi-state Measles Outbreak December 2014-January 2015", CDC Health Advisory, 23 January 2015] Measles is quite contagious, is usually uncomfortable-but-harmless, but somewhere between 1 and 3 in 1000 cases result in death. Is this a problem? Sure. Should people maybe consider precautions and update their shots? Absolutely. Should we panic? I don't usually advise panic as I seldom find it useful even when justified. Should we toss our system of free government out the window and compel vaccinations? Well, probably not.
Are "vaccine-deniers" even really the problem? That is yet to be demonstrated:
In 2013, national vaccination coverage among children aged 19—35 months was 83.1% for ≥4 DTaP doses, 92.7% for ≥3 poliovirus doses, 91.9% for ≥1 MMR dose, 82.0% for the full series of Hib, 90.8% for ≥3 HepB doses, 91.2% for ≥1 varicella dose, and 82.0% for ≥4 PCV doses (Table 1). Coverage remained stable for these vaccinations relative to 2012. Coverage with the combined vaccine series††† of these vaccines was 70.4%, similar to coverage in 2012. Coverage increased from 2012 to 2013 for HepB (birth dose) (from 71.6% to 74.2%), for rotavirus vaccine (from 68.6% to 72.6%), and for ≥1 dose of HepA (from 81.5% to 83.1%). No change was observed in the percentage of children who received no vaccinations.
["National, State, and Selected Local Area Vaccination Coverage Among Children Aged 19—35 Months — United States, 2013", Center For Disease Control, 29 August 2014]
So although prominent graphs are being shared around the Internet showing the recent spike in measles cases, there is no corresponding spike among the unvaccinated. In the current outbreak, 28 (55%) were unvaccinated, 5 of which were too young to receive the vaccination (we do not know how many from the remainder might have been contraindicated for other reasons). So, this stands for the unsurprising proposition that incidence of the disease is higher among the unvaccinated and yet vaccinated individuals still get the disease, even some who have received multiple doses.
Even with high vaccination rates (and the US is among the highest in the world["Think the U.S Has a Measles Problem? Just Look at Europe", NBC News, 7 February 2015]), outbreaks will sometimes occur. Very few diseases are in the category of smallpox in that they can even theoretically be eliminated entirely by vaccination. Most diseases have hosts or carriers other than humans to hide in. 100% vaccine coverage is never possible because some individuals are always unable to have the vaccine (or interact closely with people who cannot (see virus shedding, further on)), the distribution system is never perfect, and we don't always even have the supply we need to effect coverage of the mutitude of disease threats we face.
There is, however, a lawsuit alleging cover up of failures in quality control against Merck, the maker of the MMR vaccine, which could also explain a temporary reduction in vaccine effectiveness:
And as Merck's vaccine is the only game in town, the vaccine's "significantly degraded" quality means "there has remained a significant risk of a resurgence of mumps outbreaks," Chatom says in its complaint.
It claims that the degraded quality of the Merck vaccine played a role in a 2006 mumps outbreak in the Midwest, and in another outbreak in 2009.
[Class Says Merck Lied About Mumps Vaccine, Courthouse News Service]
The lawsuit deals with mumps, one component of the MMR-II (Measles, Mumps, Rubella) vaccine, but Merck also makes the measles component of the vaccine and it is subject to essentially the same phenomenon. It should also be noted that the whistleblowers do not allege that the vaccine is (or ever has been) unsafe, but rather that its effectiveness against wild mumps has degraded over time because neither the vaccine strain nor the test strain have been adjusted to keep pace with the ever-changing wild disease. This is the same basic reason that, for instance, our entire family, all of us current on vaccinations, came down with whooping cough in 2013 before the vaccine was updated. If that is the cause, it makes a lot more sense to sue the dog-snot out of Merck and find a better supplier than to coerce the fairly small number of people who object to vaccinations. Disease control is Red Queen Syndrome; we knew that already.

Here There Be Dragons

So, even though it isn't necessarily true that a) vaccine deniers are responsible or b) a vaccine mandate would make a huge difference, I explore the claims of vaccine deniers and of those who would mandate vaccination (in one fashion or another) and find them both wanting. Since the vaccine/anti-vaccine debate has raged over virtual hectares of the Internet, much of it does not need to be mapped here. I will endeavor to avoid the merely weedy areas of the issue, instead plunging intrepidly into the dense thickets where others fear to tread.

Dispensing With Liability

Let's first dispense with the idea that the non-vaccinated (or their parents), as irresponsible misanthropes, should be sued for wrecklessly spewing disease on their betters.
This is akin to the idea that you should sue your neighbor for leaving their house unlocked because it increases neighborhood crime, or, more charitably, for not sufficiently protecting their own house from fire and therefore exposing yours. Although the latter does have some merit and some good legal analogs in urban, densely populated areas (which we deal with later on), it simply is not the case with measles and the current outbreak even giving the idea the maximum benefit of the doubt.
Let's turn the idea on it's head for a moment. With a number of vaccines using live viruses, the recently vaccinated (often for two to six weeks) can shed virus, potentially exposing those around them. This was particularly the case with the live smallpox vaccine and live polio (neither now used in the US) and their use was often carefully avoided not just with people intolerant to the vaccine, but people who interacted with them on a regular basis. Part of the issue is that the mild strain used for the smallpox vaccine ("vaccinia" = "vaccine") could still cause disease in those with weakened immune systems or be dangerous to pregnancies and that the polio vaccine strain could spontaneously revert to the wild type, resulting in actual polio (though still typically milder).
This is less the case with measles vaccine today (the weakened form is very weak), more so with some flu vaccines and with the oral polio where it is still used. Viral shedding is rarely a threat to a healthy individual but can still potentially hurt someone with a high sensitivity, such as someone recovering from chemotherapy, AIDS, myasthenia gravis, etc., which is why some of the vaccines bear a warning on the box to avoid such contact for up to six weeks. The person who cannot take the vaccine under those conditions is usually told why, but people who may come in contact with them (and who do not know to ask!) are rarely informed when they go to get a vaccination. I have never been given that warning when getting a vaccination for myself or my child.
So, if there is a cause of action for an unvaccinated person accidentally being infected by a virus and passing that on to someone else, is there a corresponding liability for someone deliberately injected with a virus who kills Bob with myasthenia gravis and no immune protection? Is that likely to happen? No, not really, but neither is the reverse. With 90%+ vaccination rates, there are still millions of people unvaccinated in a country the size of the US. Even if we charitably assume that all 8 of the recent hospitalizations were socially-responsible vaccinated individuals injured by irresponsible, misanthropic parents, the chance of a vaccinated person dying from a specific unvaccinated person is in the range of drowning by unattended tea cup.
The problem is admittedly worse when unvaccinated people congregate together in a community because a disease has a bit easier time getting a foothold, something which health practitioners are legitimately concerned about. Recent mumps outbreaks occurred in Amish communities, for instance (although communities which experience this tend to have remarkable increases in vaccination rates the following year). Even at that, with a maximum of one or two hundred measles infections per year resulting in 1-ish per 1000 deaths, compare the (also vastly overinflated) debate over accidental firearm deaths in the US, at 505 fatalities in 2013([WISQARS]), out of over 100 million gun owners, a number which has been dropping steadily for decades. Death-by-snotty-unvaccinated-measles-ridden-child, by comparison, is as close to zero as it is possible to get, and don't get me started on the homicidal maniacs who own stairs, sidewalks, cars, or (shudder) space-heaters. That doesn't mean that you don't take precautions to protect yourself and your family from avoidable injury, but it does mean to me that you don't worry as much about suing your neighbor (at least given the numbers for measles, we'll talk if smallpox comes back...).

Is It Legal Or Moral To Mandate Vaccination?

The question involves at least two contradictory concerns: first, "Does the State have the authority to mandate the use of a vaccine?" and second, "Does the individual have a countervailing right to their own bodily integrity?" The answer to both questions is generally 'yes'. We break the issues down in the next few sections and then tackle the question of balancing these contradictory concerns.

Does the State Have Authority To Mandate Vaccination?

The State has long been recognized to have authority under the police power to deal with public health crises. One of the core reasons for government to exist is to provide for the common defense, and this applies equally to invasion, armed desperados, disease, or fire. There is no question that disease can threaten the public as a whole and that government is empowered within reason to deal with such existential threats.
The exact question of whether government may mandate the use of a vaccine was tackled by the Supreme Court just a touch over 100 years ago in Jacobson v Massachusetts [Jacobson v. Com. of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905)]. During a smallpox epidemic, the Board of Health of Cambridge, Massachusetts, authorized by Massachusetts law, required citizens to vaccinate. Henning Jacobson refused to comply, was arrested, tried, and convicted, the appeals proceeding to the US Supreme Court.
Whereas, smallpox has been prevalent to some extent in the city of Cambridge, and still continues to increase; and whereas, it is necessary for the speedy extermination of the disease that all persons not protected by vaccination should be vaccinated; and whereas, in the opinion of the board, the public health and safety require the vaccination or revaccination of all the inhabitants of Cambridge; be it ordered, that all the inhabitants habitants of the city who have not been successfully vaccinated since March 1st, 1897, be vaccinated or revaccinated. [Proclamation of the Board of Health, 27 Feb 1902, as found in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, cited above]
The court first recognized the authority of the state to issue public health regulations under the US Constitution:
The authority of the state to enact this statute is to be referred to what is commonly called the police power,-a power which the state did not surrender when becoming a member of the Union under the Constitution. Although this court has refrained from any attempt to define the limits of that power, yet it has distinctly recognized the authority of a state to enact quarantine laws and 'health laws of every description;'... According to settled principles, the police power of a state must be held to embrace, at least, such reasonable regulations established directly by legislative enactment as will protect the public health and the public safety. [Jacobson v. Massachusetts, cited above]
It then went on to tackle the question of the smallpox epidemic and the vaccination requirement:
Applying these principles to the present case, it is to be observed that the legislature of Massachusetts required the inhabitants of a city or town to be vaccinated only when, in the opinion of the board of health, that was necessary for the public health or the public safety. The authority to determine for all what ought to be done in such an emergency must have been lodged somewhere or in some body; and surely it was appropriate for the legislature to refer that question, in the first instance, to a board of health composed of persons residing in the locality affected, and appointed, presumably, because of their fitness to determine such questions. To invest such a body with authority over such matters was not an unusual, nor an unreasonable or arbitrary, requirement. Upon the principle of self-defense, of paramount necessity, a community has the right to protect itself against an epidemic of disease which threatens the safety of its members. It is to be observed that when the regulation in question was adopted smallpox, according to the recitals in the regulation adopted by the board of health, was prevalent to some extent in the city of Cambridge, and the disease was increasing. If such was the situation,-and nothing is asserted or appears in the record to the contrary,-if we are to attach, any value whatever to the knowledge which, it is safe to affirm, in common to all civilized peoples touching smallpox and the methods most usually employed to eradicate that disease, it cannot be adjudged that the present regulation of the board of health was not necessary in order to protect the public health and secure the public safety. Smallpox being prevalent and increasing at Cambridge, the court would usurp the functions of another branch of government if it adjudged, as matter of law, that the mode adopted under the sanction of the state, to protect the people at large was arbitrary, and not justified by the necessities of the case. [Jacobson v. Massachusetts, cited above]
The authority of the state to quarantine in threat of disease goes back to antiquity and, where reasonable, is upheld today, including in specific instances during the Ebola crisis. The authority to mandate vaccination has been upheld, following Jacobson, several times in the intervening 100 years, although courts have swung over time to emphasizing individual rights and it is possible that a similar matter might be rejected today because legal, social, and medical factors have changed:
The legitimacy of compulsory vaccination programs depends on both scientific factors and constitutional limits. Scientific factors include the prevalence, incidence, and severity of the contagious disease; the mode of transmission; the safety and effectiveness of any vaccine in preventing transmission; and the nature of any available treatment. Constitutional limits include protection against unjustified bodily intrusions, such as forcible vaccination of individuals at risk for adverse reactions, and physical restraints and unreasonable penalties for refusal. ["Jacobson v Massachusetts: It's Not Your Great-Great-Grandfather's Public Health Law", mariner et al., Am J Public Health. 2005 April; 95(4): 581-590]

Is Bodily Integrity a Fundamental Right?

Jacobson claimed that the Massachusetts law violated the 14th Amendment by denying him of liberty or of the privileges or immunities of a free citizen. The court agreed that the Constitution protected liberty and that the right to bodily integrity was obviously such a liberty, as well as that the removal of that liberty was open to challenge in a free society:
There is, of course, a sphere within which the individual may assert the supremacy of his own will and rightfully dispute the authority of any human government, especially of any free government existing under a written constitution. But... [Jacobson v. Massachusetts, cited above]
The court emphasized that the power could not be used arbitrarily or capriciously, and it had to be rationally justified:
... We say necessities of the case, because it might be that an acknowledged power of a local community to protect itself against an epidemic threatening the safety of all might be exercised in particular circumstances and in reference to particular persons in such an arbitrary, unreasonable manner, or might go so far beyond what was reasonably required for the safety of the public, as to authorize or compel the courts to interfere for the protection of such persons.
[Jacobson v. Massachusetts, cited above]
The court did not say that mandating vaccination would always be lawful and we will get deeper into the defined limits below. It is important to note that the Supreme Court also stated that actually administering the vaccine by force was not justifiable but that the violator could be fined or temporarily quarantined. In the end, Jacobson was jailed until he paid a fine.
Since Jacobson, a number of cases have further outlined a right to refuse treatment, including Cruzan v. the Director of the Missouri Department of Health, where the court found that a competent adult could refuse any medical treatment [Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990)].
Court cases have never seriously challenged the idea that the right to bodily integrity exists as it is so clearly inherent in the rights of life, liberty, and property as well as prohibitions of involuntary servitude. What possible meaning can property have if ownership of own's own body is not asserted? How can we say that we own the product of our labor and not our bodies themselves? In modern times, this has been further enshrined in the Nuremberg Code as a result of the trial of Karl Brandt and other doctors serving the Nazi regime for war crimes related to human experiementation without consent.["Nuremberg Code" Wikipedia, accessed 2015-02-18] Karl Brandt asserted in his defense that there were no defined principles for limiting human experimentation prior to World War II. Clearly, the tribunal disagreed, and although the Nuremberg Code may be the first international document to lay out those principles, they can be found to be well-defined as early as the 19th century ["Informed consent in human experimentation before the Nuremberg code." Vollman and Winau, BMJ. 1996 Dec 7; 313(7070): 1445-1449.]
If a right to bodily integrity is fundamental, it applies whatever we think of the individual's scruples just as does free speech or the Free Exercise clause. Scientific knowledge of danger may add to the right, but evidence of safety may not detract from it. In other words, an experimental vaccine with unknown dangers can make the right more pressing, but concrete evidence of safety cannot eliminate it: the right to bodily integrity covers the right to refuse an earring or tattoo, even though the dangers of either are very slight (several religious texts flatly prohibit them, including, interestingly, the Bible [Leviticus 19:28]), it covers the right to not eat meat or pork, to not consume orange juice without consent, or to not be treated by medical instruments believed to have been touched by unclean spirits. Analysis of relative danger can play a part in balancing the right against public safety and pressing need, but it never takes the right away nor settles the issue permanently, no matter how routine or settled a medical practice becomes.

Where Does The Rubber Meet the Road? Jacobson v. Massachusetts' 4-Prong Test

Zucht v King tackled the specific question of compulsory vaccination in 1922. The case arose under a city ordinance in San Antonio, Texas requiring "that no child or other person shall attend a public school or other place of education without having first presented a certificate of vaccination." [Zucht v King, 260 U.S. 174 (43 S.Ct. 24, 67 L.Ed. 194)] Rosalyn Zucht was denied admittance to a public school under the ordinance and subsequently denied attendance in a private school. The resulting lawsuit rose to the Texas Supreme Court which ruled against Zucht, and the US Supreme Court also effectively found against her by denying jurisdiction and dismissing the appeal.
The Zucht opinion turns on the following statement in determining that there was no controversy requiring the court's attention: "Long before this suit was instituted Jacobson v. Massachusetts had settled that it is within the police power of a state to provide for compulsory vaccination."[supra, Zucht v King, internal citation omitted] Is this statement actually true? As noted above, Jacobson easily found that the right to bodily integrity existed and was protectable, that compulsory vaccination was clearly within the police power, but that the individual application depended on a finding of necessity to support the invasion of the private person. Zucht does not merely treat the ordinance's claim of necessity with deference or allow "discretion" to the Board of Health, it omits the test entirely, and to that extent greatly misconstrues the holding in Jacobson.
However, the Zucht court omitted the test for a reason, and it has nothing to do with whether or not the actions of the Board of Health were constitutional:
These averments do present a substantial constitutional question. But the question is not of that character which entitles a litigant to a review by this court on writ of error. The question does not go to the validity of the ordinance; nor does it go to the validity of the authority of the officials.This charge is of an unconstitutional exercise of authority under an ordinance which is valid. Unless a case is otherwise properly here on writ of error, questions of that character can be reviewed by this court only on petition for a writ of certiorari. [supra, Zucht v King, internal citations omitted, emphasis mine]
Basically, the court never reached the Jacobson test in their decision because of a procedural error on the part of the plaintiff. Jacobson did hold that a mandatory vaccination ordinance would almost certainly fall under the police power (it was not facially invalid) and the question of whether the ordinance was an unconstitutional exercise of authority could not be heard by the court as brought in Zucht(*). So, like Jacobson, Zucht does not unconditionally hold that compulsory vaccination is constitutional, either, which leaves us with the question: what are the tests to determine whether such compulsion is lawful?
Jacobson established a floor of constitutional protection that consists of 4 overlapping standards: necessity, reasonable means, proportionality, and harm avoidance. These standards, while permissive of public health intervention, nevertheless required a deliberative governmental process to safeguard liberty. ["Jacobson v Massachusetts at 100 Years: Police Power and Civil Liberties in Tension" Am J Public Health. 2005 April; 95(4): 576-581.]
Although there is some overlap between the four prongs of Jacobson, it is important to emphasize that any prospective application must meet all of them. Even if compelled vaccination is found to be necessary in some specific circumstance, it also must be a reasonable means, a proportional response to the threat, and must take care to avoid unnecessary harm, in particular, avoiding application to anyone for whom the vaccine would present particular danger. Legal inquiries often decide vaccination issues on administrative matters and seldom take this aspect of the legality into account. Religious exemptions have been put in place in many jurisdictions, but this again avoids rather than solves the underlying personal freedom issue. People who wish to avoid vaccines (or a specific vaccine) now need only claim a religious scruple without proving it. If as many people are now proposing, those religious exemptions are removed, then jurisdictions will no longer have a means to avoid the full constitutional implications of a mandate in all of their potential ugliness.
If correctly applied, one could argue that the Jacobson test is intrinsicly fair. It acknowledges the existence of the personal right and requires proof that infringement of that right is concretely necessary to protect the safety of the public. Although Jacobson was decided long before the current court doctrine of levels of scrutiny for deciding whether an infringement of a right is constitutional, it closely resembles the definition of strict scrutiny (or, arguably, some level between intermediate and strict scrutiny). Under strict scrutiny, a law will be upheld if it is necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose. "Necessary" implies that the method must be the "least restrictive means" to accomplish the end.["Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies, 3rd Ed." Erwin Chemerinsky, Aspen Publishers, New York, 2006 pp 540-542]. Strict scrutiny is applied when fundamental rights are at issue, including the right to privacy. Jacobson and current jurisprudence both use "necessary" in the same context and in the same way.
It therefore follows that:
  • Vaccine mandates must meet strict scrutiny, both as written and as applied to individuals. At best, if one argues that "necessary" does not mean in Jacobson what it is now held to mean, then a prospective law must meet some bar above intermediate scrutiny ("substantially related to an important governmental purpose") and somewhat less than strict scrutiny (necessary, proportional, and not harmful).
  • Protection of the public health from a communicable disease will always be found to be a "compelling government purpose", but the "necessary" requirement must also be met.
  • Given that, as laid out in Jacobson, other alternatives to actual forced administration of a vaccine will always exist, including temporary and lawful quarantine, actual forced administration will never meet constitutional muster no matter the claimed purpose.
  • Constitutional authority for mandate of an experimental or potentially dangerous vaccine does not exist ("Today, decisions to participate in research or to use experimental and investigational drugs or 'therapies' also require the individual's informed consent, even in the military" [Mariner, et al, 2005 supra]
  • Other mandates might be constitutional, if it is the least restrictive means possible for accomplishing the State's objective in protecting the health and safety of others.
It should be noted, as the courts themselves have often noted, that the judiciary is and must be a poor judge of medical necessity. That is why the courts have generally given great deference to the local boards of health on the relative risks of health measures. At the same time, however, this means that great care must be taken in how that authority is conferred to the boards of health and the authority to violate individuals is never taken lightly. Because the courts are not often in a place to judge the result, the use of the authority ought be avoided in the first place except in those cases where there is no legitimate question that no other means is possible. As we will discuss further on, this should be an exceedingly rare occurrence in modern times.

Substantive v Procedural Due Process

There is also a legal issue at play here which is foreign to most non-lawyers, namely of procedural and substantial due process. The confusion most non-lawyers experience is partly due to the fact that the legal doctrine makes no sense. In 1873, the Supreme Court decided the Slaughter-house cases, among the very first 14th Amendment controversies before the Supreme Court. Although the 14th Amendment says, "...No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States..." the court in Slaughter-house decided that the text does not mean what it says, and interpreted it in a fashion which essentially made it useless. The courts have been tiptoeing around this issue ever since.["Reviving the Privileges Or Immunities Clause To Redress The Balance Among States, Individuals, and the Federal Government", Shankman and Pilon, Cato Institute Policy Analysis #326, 1998-11-23].
Shortly after the Civil War, the American people amended the Constitution in an effort to better protect individuals against state violations of their rights. Under the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the new Fourteenth Amendment, constitutional guarantees against the federal government could be raised for the first time against state governments as well. Although targeted initially against the "black codes" that were emerging in the postwar South, the amendment was written broadly to protect all Americans. [supra, Shankman and Pilon 1998, pp 2]
Because the Slaughter-house cases prevented the use of the Privileges or Immunties Clause for its intended purpose, later cases used the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses to apply freedoms in the Bill of Rights to the states instead. This then required that the two very different uses of the Due Process Clause be distinguished in the law. Properly appreciating the resulting mess is not possible in an article on vaccination, but anyone interested in civil rights law has to tackle the basics to understand why the system is what it is.
No person shall... be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law...[US Constitution, Amendment V]
Most people read this part of the 5th Amendment (and the corresponding language of the 14th) to mean that when something is taken away by the government, such as you are accused of a crime and stand to be imprisoned, there must be a process in place to protect your rights, such as your right to an attorney, to a trial by jury, etc. This is procedural due process. Putting someone in prison violates their rights, but, if the process is followed, they are found guilty of a crime, and justly sentenced, then depriving the right is acceptable under the Constitution.
Substantive due process, on the other hand, deals with things which the government may not do under any circumstances, even if a process is followed. Our legal system does not recognize coerced confessions under the 5th Amendment, no matter the justification. Cruel and unusual punishments are prohibited. It is not lawful to charge a poll tax or otherwise restrict the right to vote. The discussion of Jacobson above pointed out that it is not permissible to force vaccination (hold someone down and administer a vaccine by force). This, then, is a substantive due process issue. Substantive due process is what would logically fall under the Privileges or Immunities Clause, but, because of Slaughter-house, inexplicably does not.Supra, Chemerinsky, 2006 pp 545-547
There are also procedural due process issues related to vaccination. (Zucht was dismissed partly because the procedural due process issue was not presented properly to the court.) Precisely what constitutes acceptable due process depends on what right is being deprived. Usually, the minimum acceptable process requires notice of the action the government is taking and a fair hearing where evidence can be presented. The criteria for what interests must be balanced were laid out Mathews v Eldridge:
  1. the nature/importance of the private interest affected by the official action
  2. the risk of an erroneous deprivation of a right and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards
  3. the government's interest, including fiscal and administrative burden of additional procedures
[Mathews v Eldridge, 424 US 319 (1976)]
It seems clearly correct that the nature of the proceeding should be a function of the interest involved, the degree to which the procedure will make a difference, and the cost to the government. An expensive trial-type hearing would be out of place for a minor interest in a situation where there is little likelihood of a factual dispute. But an adversarial hearing is essential, despite its expense, if there is a fundamental right at stake, such as the right of parents to the custody of there children. [supra, Chemerinsky 2006, pp 582]
Although this test is fair as written, the court sometimes applies the Mathews Test, finds that additional protections are required, then ignores the result. In his dissent to the decision in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, Justice Stevens argues that the Mathews Test is not appropriate where fundamental rights are concerned (Lassiter involved parental custody) because fundamental rights should not be subject to balancing in that way. Appropriate process is (or should be) required no matter the cost or inconvenience to the government. Stevens' approach is in line with modern philosophers such as Ronald Dworkin "Taking Rights Seriously" who argues that fundamental rights, if we actually mean what we say, are still fundamental even when they are potentially dangerous or inconvenient. Dworkin, in later works, further elaborates that the nature of rights is not really to protect "life, liberty, and property" but human dignity which he defines as 1) the opportunity to succeed (not guarantee, but "opportunity") and 2) the right to define success according to the person's own criteria. Both Stevens' and Dworkins' arguments go back to this article's theme that the right to bodily integrity does not hinge on a person's desires with respect to their own body being rational and reasonable.
In applying procedural due process to vaccination, then, as the right to bodily integrity is a fundamental right, the requirements for process should be weighted in favor of the individual. Although Public Health Boards and medical experts are arguably authoritative with respect to medical necessity, they are very much inappropriate authorities for respecting bodily integrity, especially when the wishes of the individual conflict with established medical practice. The tendency is for doctors to wish to preserve life at any cost and to favor intervention; this is perhaps natural to the occupation and to the belief in the effectiveness of medical intervention, without which belief, one would be unlikely to become a doctor. However, when this tendency is at odds with the wishes of the patient, process external to the medical community is required to resolve the conflict.
At the present time, due process is observed in most states which require vaccination by limiting the spheres where vaccination is required (e.g. public schools but not private) and giving notice of the requirements. Exemptions for religion or conscience are also usually given and some type of hearing is often available to resolve issues. In some cases, the courts have determined that procedural limits are not necessary or may be minimal, such as vaccinations for immigrants (they may refuse, but they may be denied residency status as a consequence["Vaccination Requirements" US Citizen and Immigration Services, accessed 2015-02-23]) or for medical professionals at risk of exposing patients to disease who may be required to wear respirators or other precautions in lieu of vaccination, shifted to non-patient duties, or fired with little recourse ["Vaccinating the Health-Care Workforce: State Law Vs. Institutional Requirements" Stewart and Rosenbaum, Public Health Reports (1974-), Vol. 125, No. 4 (JULY/AUGUST 2010), pp. 615-618, Accessed 2015-02-24]
If, as some people now propose, the sphere of vaccinations is expanded (to include private schools or other public places, other professions) or exemptions are removed, there would need to be a corresponding increase in procedure and hearings in order to satisfy due process concerns, unless, of course, we do not, in fact, take rights seriously.

Is 'Require' Better Than 'Force'

Many people argue that vaccine mandates do not violate individual rights if they only 'require' rather than 'force'. The argument goes that as the government is not holding people down and injecting people at gun point, the constitutional issue is avoided. Mandates have therefore focused on punitive actions such as fines, or, most frequently, barring the unvaccinated from access to schools, public services, or other benefits, as exemplified in an ongoing court case in New York likely to be appealed to the Supreme Court.["New York Vaccine Requirement Is Lawful, a 2nd Court Says", Patrick McGeehan, The New York Times, 2015-01-07]Once in a while, as Austin did in the Zucht controversy, they extend the mandate to barring the unvaccinated from private facilities as well, but because of the risk of lawsuit, most jurisdictions have shied away from that extreme or built in religious exemptions.
This viewpoint has no merit. It is a principle of our society from its founding that there is no operative difference between 'require' and 'force':
It is essential to the idea of law that it be attended with a sanction... This penalty, whatever it may be, can only be inflicted in two ways: by the agency of the courts and ministers of justice, or by military force; by the COERCION of the magistry or the COERCION of arms... [Hamilton writing as Publius, Federalist #15, emphasis in original]
Note that Hamilton is not inventing a principle here but merely paraphrases Locke in "The Second Treatise of Government" who himself draws on Aristotle. As has been attributed (by Mary Baker Eddy) to George Washington:
Government is not reason. It is not eloquence, Government is force; like fire it is a dangerous servant — and a fearful master.
Or, as Justice Marshal put it in McCulloch v. Maryland, that the power to tax unmistakably involves the power to destroy. [McCulloch v State 17 U.S. 316 (1819)]
It cannot be argued that upholding the law is not an act of physical compulsion, of a lesser nature than commanding someone at gunpoint, certainly, but of the same quality. The court in Jacobson stated plainly that he would not be held down and forced to take the vaccine, yet, Jacobson was incarcerated until he paid the fine. It was a direct and natural consequence of the court decision that someone with a gun forced compliance. In the end, neither I, the Jacobson court, Hamilton, Washington, Locke, nor Aristotle appear to have a problem with that provided that the use of government force is well justified and fairly applied.
This principle has been explicitly enshrined, among other places, in the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, which is defined as holding that the government cannot condition a privilege on the requirement that a person give up a constitutional right. "For example, the government cannot condition welfare benefits on the requirement that a person agree never to criticize the government." [Chemerinsky, 2006, supra pp 557] Goss v Lopez stated that because Ohio made public education available to all and made attendance compulsory, the law "...must recognize a student's legitimate entitlement to a public education as a property interest that is protected by the Due Process Clause..." [Goss v. Lopez 419 U.S. 565 (1975)]
So, we have a holding that the opportunity to participate in public school (let alone private school) is a protectable property interest and multiple holdings that the state may not condition the exercise of a property right on the waiver of another protected right. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that a jurisdiction may not escape constitutional concerns by conditioning the right to attend public school on compliance with vaccination requirements given a fundamental right to bodily integrity. The jurisdiction would still have to show that such an invasion is necessary under the appropriate level of constitutional review and provide an acceptable level of procedural due process.

Do Vaccine-Deniers Have a Case?

Are All Vaccines Dangerous? Some History and Perspective

A general argument that "all vaccines are unsafe" and not merely unsafe but so dangerous that their use is never justified is very difficult to swallow for the simple reason that any absolute statement needs only one counter-example to be disproven. Note that we are not speaking of people who philosophically or religiously object to vaccination; as noted above, philosophical objection on bodily integrity grounds is not required to make sense. In this section, we are only dealing with categorical denial of the safety of all-things-vaccine on rational grounds and the attempt to convice others of that danger on rational grounds.
First of all, the practice of vaccination comprises a wide variety of techniques spanning what is considered modern medicinal practice. If we define vaccination (or more generally, "inoculation") as the introduction of a pathogen, modified pathogen, or simulated pathogen in order to increase immunity and potentially prevent disease, the practice would have to include variolation. In this practice, dried scabs of recovered smallpox victims would be used to introduce small amounts of the virus (though they did not understand "virus" at the time) to a healthy subject in the hopes that their body would fight off the minor infection and gain immunity. In the Americas, this was usually done by cutting or scratching a small patch of skin to introduce small amounts of the pathogen. ["Variolation", US National Laboratory of Medicine, Accessed 2015-02-25]
Variolation was in fact dangerous and was known to be so. The recipient could develop not only full blown smallpox, but other diseases could be spread by the dirty lancets as well. The only reason the practice was used was because smallpox, particularly during an active epidemic, was even more dangerous. George Washington, after much agonizing debate, implemented the practice at Valley Forge because the Continental Army was being devastated by diseases, including smallpox.["Philadelphia Poxes and Plagues", The University Archives and Special Collections Unit, Scott Memorial Library, Thomas Jefferson University, Accessed 2015-02-25 ] Historically, such disease threats in encampment are more dangerous than contact with the enemy. It would be rather difficult to argue, even if safety reporting were extremely slanted, that any modern vaccination practice is as dangerous as variolation, nor that under the dire threat of smallpox at Valley Forge that the danger was not nevertheless justified to keep Washington's men alive through the winter.
In 1796, Edward Jenner realized that an infection with cowpox, substantially less dangerous than smallpox, conferred immunity to smallpox. He experimented with inoculation of cowpox and his treatments, still dangerous, were less so than variolation. (His work, including deliberate infection of a boy with smallpox, also raises serious ethical concerns regarding medical experimentation, but that is another discussion). The medical term for cowpox was Variola Vaccinae, vacca being Latin for cow. This is where the term vaccine came from.["Edward Jenner and the history of smallpox and vaccination", Baylor University Medical Center Proceedings, Proc (Bayl Univ Med Cent). 2005 Jan; 18(1): 21-25]
Many of those who argue against the safety of all vaccines recommend natural immunity as the alternative. While it is quite obvious that natural immunity is much more effective in preventing disease than most vaccines and that is the process our body uses to protect ourselves against myriad exposures every day, it is just as obvious that death or permanent harm is a high price to pay for it. Timing is often critical to the question: during most of childhood, getting chicken pox is very low risk, while getting it as a teenager, or worse, as an adult, is quite dangerous. Getting a disease while the immune system is compromised by something else is also more risky. Ironically, when new vaccines are introduced, but before their uptake in the population is high, the timing problem can lead to higher complication rates because the probability of not being exposed until older actually goes up.
The danger of getting a common disease at the wrong time has lead to the practice of pox parties or similar to enourage a child to get a disease under the best circumstances.[Pox Party, Wikipedia, Accessed 2015-02-25]. The practice of encouraging a child to get chickenpox at the right age used to be quite common, often recommended, before the chickenpox vaccine was available. The risk of complication was always there, it was just lower than the near-certainty of complication from getting the disease later in life. It is odd that some of the same groups of people who reject (all) vaccines as too dangerous have less trouble with the risk attendant in a pox party. Once again, we need to draw the distinction between a risk-based argument and philosophical objection: encouraging early exposure makes more sense where one rejects vaccination for religious reasons, for example strict Amish communities who might not accept vaccines under any circumstances. The weightier issue is that it is hard to draw a definitional distinction between a pox party or the use of cowpox to protect against smallpox, and for example, inhaling weakened live virus to generate immunity in the Live Attenuated Intranasal Vaccine used for inoculating against flu or the Oral Polio Vaccine. All of those approaches seek to introduce a disease to the immune system under less-risky circumstances to promote immunity. It becomes a question of which technique presents the greatest risk-reward trade-off and, therefore, again, categorical rejection of vaccines based on risk appears irrational.
Many arguing categorically against vaccines object to the injection of potentially dangerous substances directly into the bloodstream. While this may raise valid questions with some vaccines, oral or nasal vaccines are obviously not subject to this objection. Similarly, because some vaccines have used live virus, attenuated live virus, killed virus, just viral or cellular components, specific proteins, or entirely synthetic proteins, targeting different diseases, some deadly, some not, some more or less contagious or common/uncommon, all of them leading to different risks/benefits, categorical denial of all vaccines on the basis of risk makes little sense.
The circumstances of active smallpox epidemic in the 1700s or the circumstances of the Jacobson case discussed above may not apply to potentially more dangerous vaccinations against less dangerous or very rare diseases, but to counter the categorical risk-based rejection of vaccines, we need not consider those cases. We need only point out that the assertion that all vaccines of all types under all circumstances against all diseases are too dangerous to consider does not hold up. Interestingly enough, the categorical promotion of vaccines or categorical stigmatization of anyone refusing any vaccine is equally senseless and for exactly the same reasons.
The weaker arguments that vaccines may be dangerous, may be unjustified in some circumstances, or may be more dangerous than often reported or considered is not subject to the same objections. At the same time that no modern vaccination technique is likely to be as dangerous as variolation, few modern disease threats are as dire as the situation faced by Washington at Valley Forge, either. We will consider some of these non-categorical objections in the rest of this section.

In What Ways Might Vaccines Be Dangerous?

Is a Mandate Actually a Good Idea Even If It Were Moral/Legal?

What Alternatives Are Available

Would Mass-Vaccination Ever Be Justified?

Antisocial Narcissists: Who the Hell Cares?

Someone I spar with occasionally online and one of them I respect more than probably 99% of the rest, characterized vaccine-deniers as "antisocial narcissists" worthy of little consideration. Is it true? Maybe. On a bad hair day (with the long hair, the beard, and legs I stole from a distracted orangutan, I have more of it to be a problem, add a migraine and every single strand of it hurts...), I might have a much more colorful response to the statement. But people do have a right to be antisocial narcissists if they want to be. With a few exceptions, people don't tend to be either perfect social creatures or antisocial narcissists, anyway; we drift in our oh so endearing ways to our own specific habits of stubborn antisocial destructive non-conformism, ranging across:
  • The guy my wife laughed about for three miles the other day who spent the whole time jockeying for position and ended the stretch of road further behind us than he started, passing at least three times in between
  • Not caring about your second-hand smoke
  • People who don't wash their hands at the restroom and then fish a mint out of the counter up front
  • People who don't clean up after their dogs in places your kids play and have access to such wonderful parasites
  • Putting off maintenance of your lights or brakes
  • Getting an SUV or truck so high it is virtually guaranteed to smush any Miata it hits into Christmas tinsel
  • Not being careful with the peanut butter knife and the jelly when your housemate has a nut allergy
  • Plugging that eighth appliance into the same outlet in a place with 50's wiring still not updated and a duplex apartment
  • Getting mad and going for a drive to cool off
  • Leaving the blasted dirt rake or hoe in the grass where I can't see it coming!
  • Alcohol and 4th-o'-July fireworks (and then lighting them with a blow-torch)
  • Getting drunk after the game and doing stupid crap
  • Four-way 'country stops'
  • Not cleaning produce before serving it to your family or not properly cooking meat, leaving Chinese food on the counter (or desk) overnight and then spending the next day in the Urgent Care
All of us hate many of these things, could spend pages listing them, some of them things we do ourselves, maybe with a whole host of moral-sounding justifications, but often inately self-destructive. These things do hurt people, perhaps spread disease, or occassionally kill directly. For most of us, the conduct is self-limiting. In our society, as long as they stay low level, it is or should just be dealt with socially and quietly. Government, and its servants, by contrast, are required to act rationally and never arbitrarily. It is simply not permissible for a peace officer or a judge to have a 'bad day' in the performance of their duties or to 'teach someone a lesson'. The bar for State intervention should be high and considered in its application, not out of irrational panic or to punish those that disagree, no matter how much they irritate us.